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Resumen
Las organizaciones no gubernamentales dicen que juegan un papel central en definir
las políticas internacionales estadounidenses, en particular sobre el tema de derechos
humanos.Aquí, examinaré la influencia de los derechos humanos y grupos humanitarios
en los debates sobre la política internacional hacia Colombia, enfocándome en el
diseño y las apropiaciones adicionales subsecuentes para el Plan Colombia, un paquete
de asistencia multibillonario que comenzó en el año 2000. Propongo que ONGs
fueron capases de usar el legado del activismo por los derechos humanos del pasado
que se concentraba en América Latina, pero que no logró una movilización popular
alrededor de éste tema. Examino los problemas estructurales que limitan ese tipo de
movilización, así cómo exploro la manera en que las ONGs sí usaron las condiciones
legislativas que se colocaron al paquete de asistencia para que la preocupación sobre
los derechos humanos se mantuviera como parte de los debates acerca de las políticas
Estadounidenses. Este caso de estudio contribuirá al registro histórico sobre cómo
las políticas se establecen y desarrollan, para ser parte de la literatura creciente que
explora la manera en que reclamos de derechos humanos se transforman en políticas
gubernamentales específicas.
Palabras clave: movilización popular, ONG, asistencia militar, relaciones colomboestadounidenses.

Abstract
Non-governmental organizations claim to play a central role in defining U.S.
foreign policy, particularly in the field of human rights. Here, I will examine the
role of human rights and humanitarian groups in the debates over U.S. foreign
policy towards Colombia, focusing on the design and subsequent additional
appropriations for Plan Colombia, a multi-billion dollar aid package beginning in
2000. I argue that NGOs were able to build on the legacy of prior human rights
activism focusing on Latin America, but failed to achieve significant grassroots
mobilization around this issue. I examine the structural issues limiting such
mobilization, as well as exploring how NGOs did leverage legislative conditions
placed on the assistance package to keep human rights concerns part of the debates
over U.S. policy. This case study will contribute to the historical record of how
policy is made and developed, adding to the growing literature exploring how
human rights claims translate into specific governmental policies.
Keywords: grassroots mobilization, NGOs, military assistance, U.S.-Colombia relations
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Introduction

N

o n - g ove r n m e n t a l
organizations
claim
to play a central role
in defining U.S.foreign policy, particularly in the field of human rights.
Here, I will examine the role of human
rights and humanitarian groups in the
debates over U.S.foreign policy towards
Colombia, focusing on the design and
subsequent additional appropriations
for Plan Colombia, a multi-billion
dollar aid package beginning in 2000. I
argue that NGOs were able to build on
the legacy of prior human rights activism focusing on Latin America, but
failed to achieve significant grassroots
mobilization around this issue. I examine the structural issues limiting such
mobilization, as well as exploring how
NGOs did leverage legislative conditions placed on the assistance package to
keep human rights concerns part of the
debates over U.S.policy. This case study
will contribute to the historical record
of how policy is made and developed,
adding to the growing literature exploring how human rights claims translate
into specific governmental policies.

1. Methods and Scope
This work, like my previous
study of Colombian human rights activism (Tate 2007), grows out of what I
describe as my “embedded” experience
with activism. In addition to my formal
fieldwork and training as an anthropologist, I have also worked over the past
two decades in a variety of capacities for
human rights and policy advocacy organizations, as well as currently serving
on the board of directors of the Latin
America Working Group. During the
initial Plan Colombia debates, I worked
as a senior fellow and Colombian analyst

52

for three years at the Washington Office
on Latin America. Founded in 1974
following the Chilean coup by a small
cohort of activists with extensive experience in Latin America,WOLA is dedicated to changing U.S. policy towards
Latin America to promote social justice.
While at WOLA, I researched the impact
of U.S. policy on political violence and
the illicit drug economy in Colombia,
and led advocacy efforts with a coalition
of U.S.-based NGOs as well as holding
frequent meetings with policymakers.
The analysis presented here has emerged
from my notes and recollections of this
experience, as well as fieldwork conducted over the past three years while a post
doctoral fellow at the Watson Institute
for International Studies at Brown University and as a visiting research fellow at
the National Security Archive. During
this fieldwork, I have examined public
and declassified government documents,
and conducted interviews with officials and activists who participated in
the debates over appropriate U.S. policy
towards Colombia. This research is part
of a larger project examining U.S. policy
towards Colombia and the origins and
evolution of Plan Colombia.
While activism against Plan
Colombia initially appeared an inevitable successor to the Central American peace movement, major grassroots
mobilization never materialized. At least
in part because of these structural factors
discussed below, there were insufficient
existing channels to resonate with calls
for activism. In my account, I stress the
structural factors in which these efforts
take place. My intention in presenting
this account is not to dismiss the efforts
to foster activism in response to U.S.
policy towards Colombia, but to illuminate the process, and in this case, the
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obstacles, to the practice of activism.This
study contributes to a growing body of
work, primarily produced by political
scientists, that examine when and how
particular issues become the focus of
human rights activism (Bob 2005; 2008).
While a number of studies have expanded on Keck and Sikkink’s important
work (1998) examining how and why
transnational campaigns succeed or fail,
scholars are only now turning to why
campaigns fail to materialize around
specific issues (Carpenter 2007).
This case study also contributes
to a growing ethnography literature
on human rights work (Goodale 2007;
Merry 2006; Speed 2007; Tate 2007).
Here, my analysis complicates the
understanding of human rights work as
“mobilizing shame.” Activists claim that
human rights discourses work in the
world by mobilizing the shame of citizens and governments, who will react
and reform to prevent further exposure
of their abuses, typified in the work of
Human Rights Watch. Academic work
theorizing this conception of human
rights work has focused on the mediaspectator relationship (Keenan 2004;
McLagan 2005; Drinan 2001). Rather
than view human rights activism as the
spontaneous result of exposure to injustice—the ‘mobilizing shame’ paradigm
of such work—I believe that we must
shift the focus to include the collective
processes that channel the subjectivities
mobilized into action. In her analysis of Southern Cone human rights
organizations, sociologist Mara Lovemen stressed the importance of “dense
yet diverse interpersonal networks…
embedded within broader national and
transnational institutional and issue
networks” as well as external support
(Loveman 1998, 477). Historian James

Green reached similar conclusions in
his work on U.S. solidarity with Brazilian victims of the dictatorship (Green
2003). An ethnographic, rather than
philosophical or media-centric, approach allows us to consider the collective
identities and material processes that are
critical to mobilizing activism. For activists, this analysis is important in order
to understand the windows of political opportunity in which activism can
thrive, in order to be able to more realistically assess the possibilities (rather
than simply to assert the necessity) of
grassroots response to particular human
rights crises, and how such responses
can be built over the long term.
Within the more restricted universe of such organizations focused on
advocating for specific policies towards
Colombia, there are a range of NGOs
that I will not focus on here, most notably the U.S. Colombia Business Partnership. Founded in 1997 and initially
convened by the Colombian embassy
during the certification crisis of the
Samper administration to bring the
perspective of business community to
the debates, they actively supported the
aid package for Colombia, and are now
lobbying for the Free Trade Agreement.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the
Colombian embassy pays approximately
USD 100,000 a month to public relations firms for lobbying in support of
additional assistance to Colombia (Davis
2007). Here, I focus on a much smaller
subset of groups, largely self-identified
as politically progressive and concerned
with human rights and humanitarian
issues, and who function as a loose coalition known as the Colombian Steering Committee (CSC). Founded in
1998, the CSC is chaired by the Latin
American Working Group and the
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U.S. Office on Colombia, and includes
more than 30 organizations.1 The CSC
has been the central location for strategizing how to promote grassroots mobilization around human rights issues in
Colombia and policy initiatives intended
to improve the human rights situation.
CSC member organizations have been
active in a number of human rights issues
in Colombia, including internal displacement, violence against religious communities, Afro Colombians, unions, and
the impact of multinational corporations
in Colombia, including Coca-Cola and
coal mining. Scholars of these efforts have
begun exploring the myriad challenges
faced by such efforts (Gill 2005; 2007;
Chomsky and Striffler 2008). Here, I will
focus on Plan Colombia debates, and the
elite lobbying strategy that developed in
response to the failure of major grassroots
mobilization efforts, in particular the
emphasis on the Leahy Law as a means
to push for human rights reforms in the
context of escalating military assistance.
2. U.S. Policy Towards Colombia
and The Legacy of Central
American Activism
U.S. based human rights and social
justice groups began to focus their interest on Colombia in the late 1990s, as
the United State government began to
increase military and other kinds of assistance to the Colombian government. In
2000, the U.S. Congress passed a USD

1

54

1.2 billion dollar aid package for Colombia, since extended in yearly appropriations to more than USD 5.4 billion in as
part of ongoing efforts to strengthen the
Colombian state and reduce the amount
of illicit coca production. The package
was designed by an interagency task force
convened by the Clinton Administration
involving a range of U.S. agencies including the Defense and State Departments.
While the Plan Colombia aid package
offered a dizzying area of programs designed “for democracy and the strengthening
of the state,” the vast majority of the aid
was destined for fumigation efforts and
military assistance. The extensive military
hardware and training made the Colombian army the primary U.S. operational
partner and was the biggest single shift in
U.S. policy which had long favored the
Colombian National Police (Crandall
2002). This shift put human rights and
the nature of paramilitary violence squarely into the U.S. policy debates.
The majority of Americans (as
opposed to immigrant Colombians) came
to the issue of human rights in Colombia with the Central American peace
movement as their primary reference
point. During the 1980s, the Reagan
Administration funded billions of dollars
to the Salvadoran military and the Nicaraguan contra forces despite their egregious human rights abuses. Thousands of
people joined a range of solidarity organizations, participating in a range of pro-

The member organizations of the Colombia Steering Committee include: the American Friends Service Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, Catholic Relief Services, the Center for Justice and International law (CEJIL), the Center for
International Policy, Church World Service, the Due Process of Law Foundation, the Federation of American Scientists, the
Franciscan Washington Office on Latin America, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Global Exchange, Institute for Policy Studies, International Labor Rights Fund, Jesuit Refugee Services, Latin America Working Group, Lutheran
Immigration and Refugee Services, Lutheran Office for Government Affairs, Lutheran World Relief, Maryknoll Office on
Global Concerns, Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Brigades International - Colombia Project, RFK Memorial Center
for Human Rights, U.S. Committee for Refugees, U.S./Labor Education in the Americas Project, Washington Office on
Latin America, Witness for Peace, World Vision, Amnesty International, Colombia Human Rights Committee/Network DC,
Presbyterian Church USA Washington Office National Ministries Division, Christian Aid. (List found at the U.S. Office on
Colombia website, http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/USOC%20Partners/, accessed April 18, 2008).
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test practices and providing humanitarian
assistance to refugees and victim communities (García 2006). The organizations
that developed during this period ranged
from radical supporters of the revolutionary groups to moderate groups pushing
for limiting military aid and promoting
negotiated settlement to the conflicts.
There is a growing literature considering
this history, including accounts of the
Sanctuary Movement within the U.S.,
broader activist participation, and activist
memoirs (Cunningham 1995; 2001; Hildreth 1994; Smith 1996).
One central legacy of the Central
America movements was the consolidation of a repertoire of practices intended
to develop activist identities and promote the practice of activism in particular ways.2 This repertoire did not emerge
simply from Central American causes, of
course, but was built on a long history of
activist practices within the United States
(Rabben 2003). These included ways in
which activists were recruited and given
the analytical tools to understand U.S.
policy as a grievance that must be remedied through action. Educational efforts
included “witnessing” tours, political
tourism orchestrated by non-governmental organizations in order to spark personal
transformation, or bringing activists and
survivors on speaking tours within the
U.S.This training also included conferences and teach-ins, which often featured
instruction in the practice of activism in
addition to forming the identity of activists. These workshops included education in media outreach (such as how to
build media contacts, provide interviews

2

to reporters and write op-eds), lobbying
your member of Congress, and connecting with and expanding existing activist
networks. Many of these educational
efforts also provided activists with the particulars of policy advocacy, including how
to develop specific policy goals, the range
of foreign policy instruments, and information about specific pieces of legislation,
amendments and Congressional debates.
Many of these efforts focused on Congress, historically only a marginal foreign
policy actor, because of the leadership role
the Democratically-controlled House of
Representatives played in opposition to
the Republican Reagan Administration.
Organizations also developed emergency
response networks, devoted to immediate
letter writing campaigns responding to
threats against activists.
Groups organizing in response
to Plan Colombia inherited these activist practices. LAWG, itself a coalition
of religious, humanitarian and solidarity
organizations, was founded in 1983 as the
Central American Working Group, and
had until the early 1990s focused entirely
on building citizen activism to oppose
U.S. policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua
and promote policy reforms. Working
with five paid staff in the Washington
office, LAWG expanded their work to
focus on support for implementation of
peace accords, humanitarian and development assistance and disaster relief, opposing the Cuba embargo, and Colombia.
Many other groups that emerged in the
1980s focused on Central America also
went on to make Colombia policy a
major focus in the late 1990s, and many

I do not mean to suggest here that this process was seamless or uncontested. In practice, there were a range of competing
visions over the appropriate response of U.S.activists to the challenges presented by U.S.foreign policy, and profound
differences among activists within different religious and political traditions.
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of the now professional policy advocates
involved in Colombia began their work
as activists focusing on Central America
in the 1980s. The legacy of organization
around Central America remained strong
even for a new generation of activists
who had been too young to participate directly in those campaigns. For the
younger generation of activists who were
in college in the 1990s and early years
of 2000s, the Central America solidarity
movement became a central touchpoint
in the history of U.S. leftist politics. Many
went to Latin America for study abroad
and learned about these efforts in college
courses and from older activists.
For activists schooled in the
Central American peace movement,
the debates over U.S. policy towards
Colombia had many similarities with
the policy towards El Salvador in the
1980s: The U.S. appeared to be strengthening an abusive military with a history of well publicized collusion with
paramilitary forces, taking sides against
long running Marxist insurgencies.
However, activists would soon discover
there were significant differences between the Central America and Colombia policy that made mobilization of
large scale grassroots activism difficult.
3. Political Context: The Cold
War and the War on Terror
One of the most important differences between activism over the past
three decades has been shift in the fundamental paradigms of U.S. foreign policy,
from the cold war to the war on terror.
During the cold war, the meta narrative of U.S. foreign policy divided the
globe into two super powers battling for
world supremacy, with proxy wars such
as Central America fought in the name
of the domino theory in which regions
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were vulnerable to Communist takeover. Within Central America, concern
over the possible export of the Cuban
Revolution (1959) and the successful
Sandinista Revolution (1979) fueled the
Reagan administration’s obsession with
the region, as did the proximity to the
United States. U.S.-sponsored military
initiatives in Central America were front
page stories and considered policy priorities for more than a decade.
The post cold war context signified a lack of central coherent metanarrative of U.S. foreign policy, without
the urgency of the apocalyptic visions of
a Soviet triumph, or the possibilities of
socialist social change.The Clinton administration and other policymakers were
attempting to redefine the U.S. global
role from the position of the single remaining super power. Some pundits suggested that human rights could now play a
more central role in foreign policy, while
others engaged in remapping the national
security threats facing the United States
to include immigration, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. These discussions
opened up space for a less overtly politicized debate of the role of human rights
in foreign policy, and for some to argue
that in the post cold war context, human
rights concerns could play a more central
role in policy. However, Latin America
was no longer the focus of human rights
debates, which prioritized the complex
conflicts in Africa and the Balkans. As
the 1990s progressed, the failure of the
U.S. and Europe interventions, including in some cases the failure to intervene, prompted debates over the validity
of the human rights framework (Cmiel
1999). Latin America, rarely in the U.S.
news, was largely viewed as a continent
that was on the path to successful transitions to democracy, and no longer in
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need of major U.S. attention. Following
the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. invasion of
Iraq and public support for the Bush
administration’s use of the attacks to justify a complete withdrawal for support of
human rights issues, greatly reduced the
political terrain for human rights advocacy in the U.S. Rather than abide by
previous efforts to restrain government
abuses, the Bush administration sanctioned the use of torture and secret and
indefinite detention. By the mid-decade,
many activists prioritized action against
the war in Iraq.
4. U.S. Readings
of the Colombian Conflict
The nature of the issues within
Colombia also made generating significant activist constituencies difficult.
Colombia was widely stereotyped within
U.S. popular culture as an ‘inherently violent’ culture primarily centered on drug
trafficking. Within the United States,
drug war politics made critiquing counternarcotics policies extremely difficult.
Numerous scholars have discussed the
development of the bipartisan consensus view of drug policies as a so-called
“third rail” issue within Washington, an
issue that cannot be touched without
being electrocuted. (Bertram et al. 1996;
Boyum and Reuter 2005; Massing 1998).
Being seen as tough on drugs is widely
viewed as important in electoral politics,
with support for zero tolerance politics (particularly those targeting people
of color, women and the poor) having
deep roots in American political culture
(Monroe 2003). The growing number
of federal and state agencies benefiting
from drug war resources resulted in economic interests in promoting counternarcotics efforts. As one of the country’s
most important drug policy historians

observers in describing the evolution
and escalation of the drug war in the late
1980s, “Thus drug policy, no longer tied
primarily to concerns about heroin, ceased to be tied exclusively to drugs at all,
having evolved into a reelection, crimeprevention, revenue-transferring, culturewar omnibus” (Courtwright 2001, 179).
Congressman Jim McGovern (D-MA),
one of Plan Colombia’s most important
critics, recalled in a 2008 interview the
importance of drug war spending, particularly to the Republican leadership in
Congress that supported the aid package.
“[Speaker of the House Dennis] Hastert
was a champion of the war on drugs, his
attitude was ‘give me what I want or you
are going to face a 30 second campaign
ad in your district saying that you are soft
on drugs, that you don’t want to stop
drugs that are coming from Colombia
into your district’.”
The perceived differences between
the nature of the internal conflicts within
Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua
also influenced the degree to which the
issue resonated with American activists.
In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government
took power from a brutal dictator in a
relatively short revolution, and began to
institute social reforms that, while ultimately unsuccessful in fundamentally transforming the country’s economy, inspired
American supporters hoping to participate in revolutionary change. The U.S.
government’s blatant support for abusive
forces attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government further galvanized
even some of the revolutionary regime’s
critics to oppose U.S. policy. In El Salvador, the united guerrilla front FMLN
maintained popular support throughout
much of the country during the 1980s
(Wood 2003), and was receptive to international pressure calling for respect for
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human rights. Even groups that rejected
the revolutionary violence of Salvadoran
insurgent groups advocated a negotiated
settlement to the conflict, believing that
the leadership could be trusted as good
faith negotiators. In the Colombian context, such views of insurgents have been
impossible given the escalating brutality
of the conflict, declining popular support
for guerrilla groups, and widespread criminality within their ranks (including
criminality developed as part of their
military strategy, such as the FARC’s use
of profits from kidnapping and drug production to finance their military expansion in the 1990s). Colombian guerrillas
have consistently rejected human rights
standards and international humanitarian
law, and have been largely unresponsive
to international pressure. The FARC has
held a number of Americans hostage
over the years, including several who are
presumed to have died in captivity and
three who have remained in their power
for more than eight years, and they killed
three American indigenous rights activists
in 1999.3 There is little evidence, particularly following the collapse of the most
recent peace talks with the FARC in
February 2002, that there is much interest
in negotiations on the part of the remaining leadership. Colombian paramilitary
groups are also substantially different than
the Central American death squads that
operated during the 1980s. In both cases,
human rights groups documented substantial ties with military forces; however, in
Colombia, revenues from drug trafficking
provided these forces a greater degree of
autonomy and offensive military capabi-

3
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lity. Human Rights Watch documented
areas, for example, in which local paramilitary leaders paid military commanders
rather than the reverse (Human Rights
Watch 2000). Colombia’s complicated
political panorama made it more difficult to recruit American activists (who,
like policymakers), often desire black and
white scenarios with clear “good guys”
and simplistic solutions.
5. Lack of connections between
the U.S. and Colombia
The United States has a long history of direct intervention in Central
America; following the construction of
the Panama Canal, relations with Colombia were more cordial and more distant.
As one Congressional aid who closely
follows Colombia observed, compared
to Central America, “Colombia feels
a lot more distant [than Central America], geographically and psychologically.”
Colombia was not felt through the presence of a large refugee population; nor
do Americans have the range of ties to
the country that they developed to Central America over the previous century.
This lack of historic connection between
the countries meant there were few established channels to serve as the foundation for activist connections.
The presence of millions of Central American refugees in the United
States brought compelling stories of persecution by U.S.-funded military forces
directly to American audiences, and galvanized the Sanctuary movement (García
2006). Refugees could travel relatively
cheaply, arriving by land on well-traveled

The nationally known activist Ingrid Washinawatok, a member of the Menominee nation and co-chair of the Indigenous
Women’s Network; Hawaiian-Mohawk Lahe’ena’e Gay, a representative of the Pacific Cultural Conservancy International, and U’wa supporter Terence Freitas, an environmental activist.The three had traveled to Arauca in support of the U’Wa
people’s attempts to limit oil exploration in their territory. The three were kidnapped by the FARC and later killed.
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immigration routes. Large refugee camps
in Mexico and Honduras provided the
opportunity for further direct engagement on a large scale. No such population arrived from Colombia. In part, this
was the result of resources; there is no land
route from Colombia to the United States because of the Darien Gap, the jungle
separating Panama from Colombia is the
only remaining break in the Pan American highway. Rather than gather in large
refugee camps, most Colombians fleeing
violence and instability left their homes
as individual family units resettling informally in shanty towns within Colombia,
creating one of the world’s largest—but
largely invisible—internally displaced
population. Even in areas where the United Nation and others anticipated large
refugee populations, like along the border
with Ecuador, shelters stood empty, for a
range of reasons including the strength of
Colombia’s economy compared to the
neighbors, growing urbanizations and the
long history of internal displacement in
the face of political violence. (Increasing
international awareness of the humanitarian crisis during the 1990s led to an
increase of international organizations
providing humanitarian assistance within
the country.) The population of Colombians emigrating to other countries did
increase (including Spain, Ecuador, and
the U.S.), but they were largely educated middle class, often identified with the
government and were not natural allies of
U.S.-based activists protesting U.S. assistance to the Colombian military. Within
the U.S., their primary political agenda
was the provision of favorable immigration status, such as Temporary Protective
Status, for Colombians.
There were also fewer connections between religious communities
within the U.S. and Colombia, parti-

cularly within Catholic and mainline
Protestant denominations that played a
central role in the Central America solidarity movement. Catholic lay missionaries inspired by Liberation Theology
with a long history of work in Central
America constituted an extensive networks of Americans with significant on
the ground experience viewed as credible
(non-radical, in many cases non political, and non biased) when they expressed dissent regarding official accounts of
political violence in the region (Nepstad
2004). These religious activists served as
the foundation for many solidarity networks (Smith 1996; also in Peru, Youngers 2003). Colombia did not have the
extreme poverty that brought Liberation
Theology-inspired religious workers to
other parts of the Andes (such as Peru and
Bolivia) and Central America, and featured a conservative Catholic hierarchy that
was less receptive to the concerns of Liberation Theology. Unlike Central America
Colombia was a net exporter of priests
and religious workers, sending many to
other parts of Latin America and Africa.
Other typical U.S.-Latin America connections were also not present in
Colombia. As a relatively well developed
middle income country, the nation was
host to few humanitarian workers until
the IDP crisis of the late 1990s.The Peace
Corps program in Colombia lasted from
1961 to 1981, with a relatively large number of total volunteers compared to Central
America (4,600) but without the annual
flow of new volunteers returning to form
a critical base of interest in the country.
Colombia has historically maintained
relatively few academic connections with
U.S. universities, preferring to send students to Europe, particularly France and
England. Within the U.S., there are relatively few Colombianistas, given the real
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and perceived dangers of fieldwork and
the general view that Colombia remains
an exception to the academic models and
theories of the region.
6. Activist Response
This is not to say that there has
been no activist response to U.S. policy
towards Colombia. In this section, I
will outline efforts to organize activism
in opposition to Plan Colombia, and
highlight the achievements of the lobbying strategy adopted by the NGOs that
focused on U.S. policy towards Colombia, in particular the conditions placed
on U.S. assistance to Colombia, and the
Leahy amendment. I will conclude with
some of the critiques of this strategy, and
some lessons for thinking about human
rights activism in the 21st century.
It is important to locate these
efforts within the larger context of the
professionalization of human rights activism. Much of the recent research on
human rights activism has stressed professionalization as a contested process (Tate
2007; Merry 2006; Goodale 2006; 2007).
Some groups, typified by the approach
of Human Rights Watch, have attempted
to completely divorce their activism to
promote human rights from social movements and so-called “politicized” human
rights activism.“Human rights work cannot be confused with solidarity groups,”
one former senior Human Rights Watch
staff member told me. The organization
devoted their substantial resources to
publishing reports, promoting the use of
international human rights legal standards,
and elite lobbying targeting the media
and policymakers. However, the majority of professional human rights activists
attempted, to a greater or lesser degree, to
foster grassroots interest and mobilization,
generally employing the repertoire of
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tactics described above. Amnesty International, founded in 1961, remained a
membership organization who included
grassroots mobilizing and letter-writing
campaigns among their central strategies
to promote human rights. On a much
smaller scale, the Washington Office on
Latin America, founded in 1974, was a
critical link for grassroots groups within
the U.S. and Latin America interested in
influencing U.S. policy. All these organizations including Human Rights Watch
used both volunteer and paid staff; regardless of their status, all that I interviewed
referred to themselves as “activists.”
In U.S. policy debates, Colombia
had long been considered a drug policy
issue, not a human rights issue, and was a
low priority for these institutions throughout the 1990s until Plan Colombia focus
on military assistance made human rights
a more salient issue. The major human
rights groups (including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and on a
much smaller scale,WOLA) had conducted periodic research missions to Colombia, and published regular reports for
more than a decade. Beginning in the late
1980s, two Colombian immigrants, both
married to Americans and settled in the
U.S., established human rights committees
in Washington (the Colombia Human
Rights Committee) and Madison, WI
(the Colombia Support Network). These
committees have been important outposts of U.S.-based activism on Colombia, serving as a base for speaking tours
of Colombian activists throughout U.S.
While membership in these committees
has varied, in general they have maintained a small core of participants who are a
mix of progressive Colombian immigrant
and U.S.-born activists; they have also inspired activists to create associated small
committees in other cities.They have also
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partnered where possible with interested
policymakers and analysts and academics.
In one of the first major expressions of
interest among NGOs that previously had
not addressed Colombia, in January 1998 I
helped organize a delegation to Colombia
of NGO leaders from Washington. The
group included the director of WOLA,
a senior associate from the Center for
International Policy, and the then Deputy
Director of the Latin America Working
Group as well as religious representatives
from the United Church of Christ. All
went on to make Colombia advocacy and
activism a major focus. In their lobbying
on Plan Colombia, concern about paramilitary abuses, their ongoing links with
officials, and impunity for past abuses were
the central concerns.
7. Limited Grassroots
Mobilization
All the members of the Colombia
Steering Committee employed tactics
learned from previous activism and other
groups. Much of their work organized to
target sympathetic members of Congress
to lead opposition (almost all Democratic) to Colombian military assistance. One
of their central allies was Congressman
Jim McGovern (D-MA). As a Congressional aid, he had traveled to El Salvador
in the 1980s to investigate impact of U.S.
military aid there and worked on the
Congressional commission investigating
the murder of four Jesuit priests, their
housekeeper and her daughter by an
elite squad of U.S.-trained Salvadorian
soldiers in 1989. His foreign policy aid,
Cindy Buhl, had served as the director of
Central America Working Group in the
1980s, and was also very active on the
Colombia issue. McGovern sponsored a
series of amendments to reduce military
assistance to Colombia.According to one

activist working with an advocacy group,
“the main goal of getting a better vote
on the McGovern amendments, and
making sure that the vote was seen as a
message to the Colombian government,
to the paramilitaries and to the military,
to clean up their act.” Activists working
within LAWG would identify swing
voters and attempt to mobilize people
in their district to lobby the member
of Congress. They would then contact
membership organizations (including
religious groups, Amnesty International,
labor unions, and other grassroots organizations). Efforts to educate constituents
on Colombian issues including bring
speakers to tour those districts and convening public meetings. In some cases,
they attempted to reach out to particular constituencies with news of targeted
Colombians from those groups, such as
African Americans, women, unions, teachers, and religious people. Attempting
to draw established activists into Colombia work had limitations, however. One
activist concluded, “I don’t think we had
a significant impact. …In a lot of cases,
with a lot of people, I think the people
we would go to were the go-to activists
on a lot of different issues, and Colombia
never became their priority issue.”
There were a number of relatively
large events organized to mobilize interest in Colombia between 2000 and 2003,
many centered around college campuses
and through existing activist networks.
One AI activist recalled hundreds of
people attending events organized on the
west Coast and Midwest teach-ins. “You
could tell there was growing grassroots
interest because there were large crowds at
these events. And because of the growing
support for the McGovern amendments.
There was that kind of thing going on
all the time, until September 11.”Activists
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agree that the 9/11 attacks, and particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq, had a
profound impact on efforts to generate
grassroots interest in Colombia.
8. Elite Lobbying Strategies
Despite these setbacks, human
rights activists continued their elite lobbying efforts, working with allies within
the government and Congress. Throughout the 1990s, a growing bureaucratic
infrastructure within the government
developed to address human rights concerns.4 Human rights policy tools developed by policymakers include private
diplomatic discussions; public statements
by government officials; documenting
abuses in the annual State Department
reports; reporting on specific human
rights issues as required by legislation;
prioritizing aid to reflect human rights
goals; human rights training programs
for military, police, government officials;
sanctions; support for human rights cases
moving through the legal system; participation in verification and promotion
missions; support for human rights work
at the Organization of American States

4

5

62

and the United Nations (although the
U.S. is not a signatory to the majority
of human rights treaties); and military
intervention (such as the 1994 Operation
Uphold Democracy in Haiti). Despite
significant effort devoted to development of some policy tools, to date there
is no consensus regarding the long-term
impact of these policies or which are
most effective (Mertus 2004; Sikkink
2004). For example, some officials argue
that the most appropriate policy towards
abusive government is engagement,
including financial assistance which
increases U.S. leverage, while others
argue that cutting off assistance to governments involved in violating human
rights avoids implicating the U.S. in abuses and demonstrates the importance of
respect for human rights. It is important
to note that unlike Western Europe and
Canada, where governmental human
rights agencies address domestic issues,
U.S. governmental human rights efforts
are considered foreign policy initiatives
and devoted exclusively toward attempting to influence the behavior of other
governments.5

The broader context for this is, of course, that U.S.policies have in many cases contributed to human rights abuses as
the U.S.offered support, and in some cases, direct participation, in the overthrow of democratically elected governments
(such as in Guatemala 1954 and Chile in 1973) as well as supporting abusive military forces throughout the continent.
The military regimes that replaced them engaged in the most serious abuses of the past century, including the disappearance and murder of hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans. The military regimes that took power in Brazil (19641985), Uruguay (1973-1985), Chile (1973-1990), and Argentina (1976-1983) employed significant political violence
against their real and perceived opponents, while enjoying U.S.support. U.S.policy also contributed to human rights
abuses during the Central American civil wars of the 1980s, when the Reagan administration provided military assistance
to abusive governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, and provided support for the Nicaraguan Contra forces.
The only U.S. state human rights agency is the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the
lead federal agency charged with implementing U.S. foreign policy and representing U.S. interests abroad. Originally
called the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the division was created in October 1977 by Congressional mandate and reflected Carter’s emphasis on human rights. The office was staffed with career Foreign Service
Officers, while the first leaders were political appointees who had been active in the civil rights movement. The agency
faced numerous obstacles including considerable resistance from other bureaus within the State Department. With only
20 staff members in 1979, President Ronald Reagan weakened the bureau. President Bill Clinton changed the name
to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DHL) and expanded the mandate in 1998. Each March, by
Congressional mandate, the DRL must produce hundreds of pages addressing a growing range of human rights issues in
almost every country in the world; the 2004 report was 5,000 pages long and covered 194 countries. Embassy human
rights officers draft the reports, which then are revised by DHL staff in Washington. These reports were often accused of
political bias, particularly during the Reagan administration; by the end of his term, U.S. based human rights groups the
Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights was publishing critical evaluations and counter-reports. The office also provides
assistance to human rights programs abroad through USAID funded programs (Denzer 2000).

U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

U.S. government human rights
policy was in part the result of dedicated officials, but would not have made
the limited progress it did without considerable pressure from domestic advocacy groups promoting human rights
in Latin America. International nongovernmental organizations including
the religious organizations, solidarity
groups, and human rights groups provided training, support and public awareness for human rights groups throughout
the continent. Following Congressional
concern over the accuracy of information from the executive following the
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, members of Congress began taking
a more activist orientation towards
foreign policy and international affairs.
Congress included Section 502B in the
1974 Foreign Assistance Act, requiring
that security assistance to governments
which grossly violated human rights to
be restricted; in 1976 a provision was
added allowing the president to continue aid to abusive governments under
“extraordinary circumstances.” Section
116 of the 1976 Foreign Assistance
Act required human rights conditions
be considered in economic aid as well.
However, these measures have never
been applied. Country-specific conditions on human rights assistance were
applied to numerous countries including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and
Colombia. The Congressional Human
Rights Caucus was founded in 1983
to organize briefings and Congressional testimony on human rights issues.
In 1996, the Leahy Amendment barred
U.S. counternarcotics assistance units

6

credibly alleged to have participated in
gross violations of human rights abuses; the amendment was subsequently
amended to all foreign military assistance and made into permanent law. In
part because of its more limited scope,
this law has been more widely applied,
and military units in Colombia, Bolivia
and Mexico have been suspended from
receiving U.S. assistance.
Professional advocates, most of
them based in Washington, achieved
some significant results through their
elite lobbying strategy. In addition to
documenting abuses, this work involved developing lobbying strategies,
relationships with government allies,
designing specific materials for use in
Washington lobbying, and providing
testimony and questions for members
in hearings. Elite lobbying required
detailed knowledge of policy processes,
including the positions and motivations
of distinct agencies and policymakers, as
well as legislative and committee schedules and procedures. In some cases,
activists were able to get their concerns
written into the legislation, through
conditions placed on assistance and the
Leahy Law.
When Plan Colombia was passed by Congress in 2000, the legislation included human rights conditions
focused mainly on severing the links
between the security forces and paramilitary groups.6 These measures required
that the State Department certify that
the president of Colombia has issued
a directive that cases involving soldiers
and officers be tried within the civilian
court system, and the officers in ques-

An additional condition included in the legislation required the implementation of a strategy resulting in the total elimination of coca and opium by 2005.
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tion suspended from duty, and that the
security forces are fully cooperating
with these measures and with investigations, and the development of Judge
Advocate General Corps. Activists
involved in creating the conditions had
drawn on previous examples implemented in the cases assistance to Serbia
and Peru. In the first year, the Clinton
administration waived the conditions
on the national security grounds; subsequently the Bush administration simply
certified over the objections of human
rights groups. Despite the failure of the
conditions to impact aid delivery, activists argued that the conditions served
several important functions. First and
foremost, the conditions kept human
rights issues in the debate, and forced
a yearly discussion of the human rights
situation in Colombia. The certification process also provided an important
incentive for Colombian government
action on specific cases in order to
provide justification for the annual
certification. Unlike general human
rights legislation, the conditions were
written specifically in response to the
situation in Colombia, and were modified as the legislation went through
the yearly appropriation process. NGO
activists complained, however, that the
Colombian government would present
statistics claiming to represent progress
in terms of human rights but without
the real substantive changes in policy.
But in the words of one activist, “until
September 10, we had something
going. We were players, the human
rights community was in the game, we
mattered. We didn’t get everything we
wanted, we didn’t even get half of what
we wanted, but we were relevant in a
way that we hadn’t been seven or ten
years before.”
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What became the Leahy Law
began as the Leahy Amendment, first
passed in 1996. The genesis of the
bill was activist concern over military
assistance to abusive units in Colombia. A 1994 Amnesty International
report included cases of human rights
abuses in Colombia involving 13 specific military units. AI staff sent copies
of the report and a letter requesting
information about the assistance and
U.S. monitoring efforts to U.S. government officials but received no reply.
However, the U.S. embassy did prepare a analysis revealing that 12 of the
13 units mentioned in the report had
received U.S. assistance; a sympathetic
official leaked the list to an investigative journalist, who then passed it to
AI staff in Washington. Meanwhile,
a Senate staffer concerned about the
issue began an email exchange with the
AI Washington director, who modified
her proposal and sent them to Tim
Reiser, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
staff on the foreign relations committee with a profound commitment to
human rights issues.
The Leahy Law began as requiring the U.S. to suspend counternarcotics assistance to units credibly alleged
to have participated in abuses where
the government is not taking corrective
measures. The law was designed to be
narrower than Section 502B in that aid
was only suspended to particular units
rather than cut off to an entire country,
and although it did not include a waiver option the aid could be continued if
the recipient government demonstrated
that they were engaged in corrective
measures (such as investigations of the
allegations). The measure was expanded
to cover the entire foreign appropriations bill and eventually the Defense
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Department; the amendment was also
made into permanent law. The major
debates over implementation have
focused on the interpretation of specific
wording, most importantly what constitutes a “unit.” If an entire division, battalion, or company of military personnel
were to be trained, clearly that would
constitute a unit and the entire group
would have to be vetted. For individuals
attending training, the debate was over
whether or not his group had to be vetted. Eventually, the interpretation was
ruled to be that the “unit to be trained
is the unit to be vetted;” thus even individual soldiers from abusive units may
participate in training unless abuse can
be traced to their name. Both AI staff
and the Congressional aids that worked
on the legislation feel this interpretation
violates the intention of the bill.
The law was extremely controversial within the Colombian military
establishment; General Bonnett, then
head of the armed forces, refused to sign
the required memorandum of agreement with the U.S. State Department
stating that he would comply with the
conditions for almost a year. Some U.S.
officials also objected to the law. In
one of the most notorious examples,
declassified embassy cables revealed that
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert
told Colombian military officials, saying
he would work to “remove conditions
on assistance” and complained about
the previous years of “leftist” influence
in the U.S. Congress that “used human
rights as an excuse to aid the left in
other countries.” Hastert promised to
promote counternarcotics assistance
and recommended that Colombian
officials should “bypass the U.S. executive branch and communicate directly
with Congress” (Evans 2002).

The Leahy Law has had a
substantial impact on U.S. policy in
Colombia, although not always in the
ways in which the original authors of
the bill may have wanted. Senior State
Department and Defense Department
officials who participated in the design
and implementation of the first years of
Plan Colombia agreed that the military
strategy promoted by the United States
was determined in part by the Leahy
amendment requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the majority of U.S.
assistance was provided to the Colombian National Police. In 1998, the U.S.
signed a new inter-military cooperation agreement, and began training
and funding the first counternarcotics
battalion of the Colombian army. With
Plan Colombia, the development of
counternarcotics battalions became the
centerpiece of the “Push into Southern
Colombia”, with military assistance
making up approximately 80% of the
package.As one senior policymaker told
me, “They made the decision that no
unit that existed could meet the standard, so they started from scratch.There
were three new units created, and then
they watched them like hawks.” Leahy
requirements meant aid intended for
some existing battalions, including the
17th brigade and the 24th brigade, were
suspended.
According to Leahy supporters,
the provision sent a very important
message that human rights issues are
important to the U.S. Congress. The
law encouraged conscientious officials,
along with investigative journalists and
activists, to pursue cases; it also required
tracking military assistance and vetting
its recipients. Activists and Congressional staff concerned about Leahy implementation used the Senate confirmation
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of ambassadors and public hearings to
ensure compliance, as well as to emphasize the importance of the human rights
message. According to one former Congressional aid, “my experience was that
with career ambassadors before the
Senate, [if] you make any fuss or hint
that their confirmation could be in jeopardy[,] you can get them to really pay
attention.Working on the senate foreign
relations committee, the committee
had an unbelievable leverage point.” All
embassies were required to comply with
the measure; some of the other well
publicized cases in which compliance
with the Leahy Law led to the suspension of aid include Mexico, Turkey and
Sri Lanka.
However, even Leahy supporters acknowledge that the measure has
severe limitations. First, it places the
burden on the victims of human rights
violations to identify their attackers,
arguably creating an incentive for the
establishment of irregular forces, disguising the identity of military forces
during operations and the formation
of paramilitary groups. Second, there
is a clear loophole, employed by the
U.S. in the case of Colombia: creating new units to bypass the vetting
requirements. Rather than restricting
aid until the entire military force was
sufficiently reformed to pass Leahy
requirements, the U.S. opted to create
new military units geographically isolated from the rest of the force. It’s also
important to note that the Leahy Law
requires not a complete end to abuses,
but the absence of allegations or the
lack of corrective measures including
investigations. Assessing the role of
Leahy in encouraging the investigation,
prosecution and incarceration for those
responsible is also extremely difficult;
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given current figures provided by
human rights activists and journalists in
Colombia, it is difficult to see progress
on this front. According to one of the
law’s first promoters, “I am not aware
of any place where the Leahy Amendment ended up being an anti-impunity
law.” However, Leahy supporters insist
that the measure has been a useful tool
to continue to bring human rights
pressure on the U.S. government and
their military allies.
Activists within the United States remain divided over the appropriate
strategies to best promote social change
and human rights in the U.S. and in
Colombia. Activists within grassroots
organizations critique elite advocacy
requiring compromises and ‘insider’
strategies employed by NGOs in Washington, believing their mandates to be
more confrontational and protest orientated, with little interest in negotiating
their demands for dramatic changes
in U.S.policy. Others take issue with
the high turn over and relatively short
institutional memories of NGOs, characterized by low pay and long work
hours, with many activists focused on
political analysis rather than direct grassroots organizing. Such divisions have
long been common within activist coalitions, as scholars of social movements
have observed in other cases.
Conclusions
Academics and practioners seeking to understand the possibilities and
limitations of human rights activism
need to look beyond the “mobilization
of shame” to the study of social movements in order to better understand
why some human rights crises generate
grassroots responses abroad and others
do not. As I have presented here, the
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political context for such movements
play a significant role in the international response, above and beyond the
seriousness of the political violence
in question. Thus, I argue that international human rights activism must
be understood as the product of local
political cultures, along with the cultural and material resources available to
producing such activism. Despite these
limitations, and the criticisms offered by both activists and scholars, the
increasing professionalization of human
rights activism has generated some significant policy responses, even in cases
of limited grassroots mobilization.
Professional human rights defenders,
working with allies within the U.S.
Congress, made the Leahy Amendment
prohibiting assistance to abusive military units into permanent law.They also
incorporated human rights conditions
into legislation. However, assessing the
impact of such efforts is difficult. The
State Department first waived, and then
certified their adherence to, the human
rights requirements in the legislation
despite the objections of human rights
researchers. The Leahy law changed
U.S.military strategy, leading to the
creation of new military units. Activists
argue that such measures keep human
rights concerns in the policy debates,
and create mechanisms for pressure on
the Colombian government for investigations on specific cases. There still is
a significant debate within the human
rights community, however, over how
to best promote human rights and
governmental policy reforms. A more
complete understanding of the longer term impact of such measures will
requires time, while observers measure
the governmental human rights responses over the coming decades.
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